Is local government fragmentation politically motivated An empirical study on Bangladesh

Abstract

Recent literature suggests that administrative fragmentation can be 
politically motived. This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the 
determinants of administrative fragmentation at the subnational level of a unitary 
country- Bangladesh. The study conducts a panel data analysis at the district level 
covering the period from 2001 to 2010 and tests some conventional theories of 
distributive politics. The objective is to identify whether ‘political motive’ or 
‘administrative need’ plays the key role in the local government unit creation 
process. Two alternative indicators of fragmentation- Units per district land area and 
Units per district population were regressed against the political variables (district’s 
core vote share for the ruling party, number of ministers, and the number of MPs 
aligned with the ruling party) and the conventional indicators of fragmentation (e.g., 
land area, population, poverty level, administrative convenience). Spatial regression 
analysis (applying both Spatial Lag Model and Spatial Error Model) was conducted 
to capture the impact of the possible spillover effects in the unit creation process. 
Results show that the conventional determinants do not fully explain the 
fragmentation process. However, political patronage, captured by the number of 
ministers in a district and local MP’s political alignment with the ruling party in the 
government plays a significant role in determining the number of local units at the 
district level of Bangladesh.