On Robert Kane’s Account of Self-Forming Actions

Abstract

[Abstract: Robert Kane thinks that an agent becomes the ultimate originator of her actions—and hence, morally responsible for her actions as well—by being the ‘setter’ of her actions, i.e. by performing ‘will-setting’ actions. By performing such ‘will-setting’ actions the agent forms her ‘self’, and that is why such actions are termed as Self-Forming Actions (SFAs). Kane’s account of SFAs plays a very central role in his theory of free will and moral responsibility. In the present paper I have tried to show that Kane’s account dose not succeed to avoid luck objection. One’s so-called self-forming action is done ‘by chance’. Since one is not ultimately responsible for an action that is done by chance, one is not responsible for one’s self-forming actions (SFAs). Again, since one is not responsible for one’s SFAs, the theory SFAs cannot account for ultimate responsibility. So, I have concluded that Kane’s account of Self-Forming Actions (SFAs) involves responsibility-subverting luck problem which severely undermines the tenability of the whole theory. Had it resolved the luck problem, it would have been one of the most plausible theories in the relevant field.]