Ground of Induction

Abstract

[Abstract : Induction as a process of inference provides us with new knowledge. This knowledge is revealed through observing particular instances using some general propositions. A question raises; what accounts for the justification of this leap from particular to general? Mill assumes that nature is uninformed and a particular instance is likely to produce the same effect under the same conditions. Hume, on the other hand, describes that the cause and effect relation is not a necessary connection but a matter of habit and this connection is inadequate to settle down the ground for the legitimacy of induction. Bradley, on the contrary, refuses that induction can move from particular to the general. Russell argues, more frustratingly, that the induction principle cannot be proved or disproved by appealing to experience. Despite being suspicious about the cogency of induction, it cannot be rejected as a process of reaching to the unknown from the known, as a method of producing new knowledge. For this, it is necessary to provide a rational ground for induction in which it is justified. First, this paper argues that there is no such universal logical principle to prove the justification of induction, and second, this justification is to be supported by appealing to the pragmatic worth of the process.]